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Taxpayers’ Lack of Standing in
International Tax Dispute Resolutions:
An Analysis Based on the Hybrid Norms
of International Taxation
Limor Riza
Preface
Assume a hypothetical but very plausible scenario in which you had
invested substantial fortune and efforts in a cross-border transaction.
You entered this transaction after a thorough field study and you even
consulted some tax experts in order to estimate your potential tax
burden. The tax advisors succeeded in calming you down by drawing
your attention to the fact that the transaction will be carried out in a
state that has signed a bilateral tax treaty with your resident state. That
means that you will avoid the problem of double taxation. Willingly you
carried out the transaction and the outcome is quite successful and even
exceeded your expectations. You are aware that you have to share your
success with the tax authorities and pay income tax. Though, suddenly
you realize that since your transaction is quite complicated and unusual
both states claim full share and you face double taxation. You know that
there is a procedure stipulated in the treaty enabling the states to resolve
problems of double taxation. Now, it is your money at stake, but the two
contracting states exclude you from their negotiation. To put it gently,
you are not satisfied with this conduct; you believe it is unfair since it is
your money and you should have standing in the procedure. I am awfully
sorry to inform you but I believe you should not. If you are interested to
know why I believe that you and other taxpayers should not have a
standing in conflict resolutions arising due to double tax treaties you
are welcome to read this paper.
This paper examines whether a taxpayer should have “standing”1 in


Carmel Academic Center, Haifa, Israel.
1. "Standing" is a term usually applicable to federal courts, but I analogize it here
with the right to be heard in international dispute resolutions. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
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international dispute resolutions. To answer this question the primary
task is to identify the nature of international taxation. In other words,
this paper discusses how to classify the field of international taxation. Is
it part of public international law, private international law (i.e., conflict
of laws), national (domestic) law, or is it a hybrid field that requires
specific attention? Making this distinction is vital for resolving disputes
when a taxpayer is taxed twice for cross-border transactions in cases
where the double tax convention is unclear and both contracting states
claim full or partial tax on accrued income.2
In 1924, the Permanent Court of International Justice defined
dispute as “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or of interests between two persons.”3 In the case brought before
the Court in 1924, it determined that the dispute started between an
individual and a state, but then the individual’s government “took up the
case. The dispute then entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain
of international law, and became a dispute between two States.”4 If we
analogize that case to a tax case derived by a cross-border transaction,
there is no doubt that we have a dispute — a dispute on tax liability. But
there are still two lingering doubts. First, is it an international dispute?
And second, who are the parties to it? If one examines the current
mechanisms available in the OECD Model Tax Convention for resolving
double taxation disputes, one realizes that the taxpayer’s standing is
somewhat ambiguous. In order to clarify this ambiguity we need to
address the question of categorizing the conflict as a national or
international one.
The question at stake is whether a taxpayer should be a party to the
dispute resolution process. In this paper, the cases cited are limited to
where double tax treaties apply. I reserve the cases where they are
inapplicable to further discussion.
Part I highlights the tax complexity arising from cross-border
transactions. Since the article focuses on OECD Model dispute
resolution mechanisms, Part II briefly introduces the model’s history and
2. It seems that tax conflicts are inevitable and can be avoided only by supernational authority as argued in MARIO ZÜGER, ARBITRATION UNDER TAX TREATIES:
IMPROVING LEGAL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 3 (2001).
3. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
3, at 11 (Aug. 30) [hereinafter Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions]. This verdict
represents the orthodox approach of diplomatic protection. See Zachary Douglas, The
Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 165
(2004).
4. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, at 11.
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its official aims. Part III discusses the available dispute resolution
mechanism in the OECD Model — the Mutual Agreement Process
(MAP) and Arbitration. Part IV reviews the hybrid elements of
international taxation. This paper suggests that international taxation has
both national and international characteristics. This hybrid nature is the
basis of the discussion in Part V: after identifying the parties to the
international tax dispute, this paper suggests two solutions to the research
question — the apparent and normative solutions. In the former, a
taxpayer should have standing in the international dispute, though recall
that this solution is not based on normative grounds. The normative
rationale introduces the equity principle whereby taxpayers should have
no official role in resolving the dispute. Finally, this paper offers a brief
recommendation in Part VI.
I.

The Complexity Arising from Cross-Border Transactions

It is commonly accepted that there is an ongoing globalization
process whereby goods, capital, services, people and ideas move from
one state to another. One example is international transactions where a
foreign corporation engages in economic activities with another
corporation in a different jurisdiction. Another very common example is
multinational enterprises that conduct business worldwide. Modern laws
endeavor to resolve disputes arising from these kinds of contemporary
cross-border transactions.
One aspect of law relevant to cross-border transactions is tax law or
more precisely international tax law (though some conflicts may occur
between one state’s bank secrecy law and another’s tax laws).5 In the
above example of a corporation doing business in a different jurisdiction,
it may be liable to double taxation. Many countries have signed bilateral
double tax conventions to mitigate this problem.6 Those conventions
regulate how to divide the tax liability between the contracting states. For
instance, the United States has signed double tax treaties with more than
sixty countries,7 and the United Kingdom with more than 100.8 Today,
5. An example is the UBS saga where American tax authorities demanded
disclosure of American citizens’ bank accounts kept in Swiss banks (UBS). See Charles
H. Gustafson, The Role of International Law and Practice in Addressing International
Tax Issues in the Global Era, 56 VILL. L. REV. 475, 475-78 (2011).
6. This article focuses only on the aim of reducing double taxation and not on the
other official or unofficial goals of double tax treaties.
7. See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, available at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-
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the global network of bilateral double tax treaties exceeds 2,000.9
II.

Introduction to Double Taxation and the OECD Model Tax
Convention

In order to answer the first question I need to address the
classification of the field of international taxation. This classification has
little relevance to straightforward cases that raise no particular dilemmas
for tax division between contracting states. It is significant, however, in
tax disputes between a taxpayer and the two contracting states. Today,
double tax conventions based on either the OECD or the UN model
include a specific article (Article 25) that establishes a mutually agreed
procedure for eliminating double taxation and resolving conflicts of
interpretation. This procedure invites competent authorities to mutually
agree to resolve disputes where a taxpayer is subject to taxation that is
not in accordance with the convention.
Since state tax laws may conflict in the international arena, a
taxpayer may be subject to double taxation. Double taxation could arise
in various scenarios where a state taxes its residents on extraterritorial
income. In the classical example, double taxation occurs when a resident
of state X generates income in state Y. State X can tax its resident by
virtue of its residence-based regime and state Y by virtue of its territorybased regime. Moreover, double taxation can arise due to double
“residence” or “territory”. Sometimes countries unilaterally solve the
problem of double taxation by recognizing a tax relief in national law in
the form of foreign tax exemption, credit10 or deduction. But in order to
eliminate or at least mitigate the double tax problem many countries have
signed bilateral double tax conventions usually based on either the
OECD or the UN model. Those models serve as a noncompulsory
format and negotiation platform between states.11 Although the number
of such treaties is growing,12 there is no multinational double tax
convention as yet. It seems that because of distinct domestic tax regimes
Treaties---A-to-Z.
8. See Double Tax Treaties, available at http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subjectgateways/tax/double-tax-treaties.
9. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 3 (2007); see also Victor Uckmar, Double
Taxation Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 149 (Andrea Amatucci ed., 2006).
10. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (the foreign tax credit applied).
11. See, e.g., Uckmar, supra note 9, at 151.
12. See, e.g., id. at 149.
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and interests it would be difficult to formulate such a convention.13
As aforesaid, the OECD model is a popular model that serves as the
basis for many bilateral conventions. Thus, it has attracted widespread
scholarly attention. Therefore, I will use it as my main point of
reference.
III. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the OECD Model
A. The Default Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Mutual Agreement
Process
Article 25 of the OECD Model stipulates some dispute resolution
guidelines. First, Articles 25(1) and 25(2) regulate the procedure where
taxpayers are taxed not in accordance with the treaty. Second, Article
25(3) is designed to resolve difficulties related to the treaty’s
interpretation and application and solve the problem of lacunas.
In case Article 25(1) applies, the taxpayer may present his matter to
“the competent authority of the contracting state of which he is a
resident”.14 The taxpayer may do so even if he has not exhausted all
remedies under domestic law.15 If the case is justified, the competent
authority has to endeavor to settle the controversy.16 Thus, a prerequisite
to entering a mutual agreement is that “the objection appears to [the
competent authority] to be justified . . . .”17 This condition grants the
competent authority with discretion whether to accept or reject the case.18
13. On the difficulties of formulating a multination convention, see paragraph 37 of
Introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital,
I-11, ¶ 37 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital2010_9789264175181-en [hereinafter OECD, Model Tax Convention].
14. Id. at M-59.
15. See id. at C(25)-12, ¶ 31.
16. See id. at C(25)-12, ¶ 2.
17. Article 25(2) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59.
But see Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 703, 717, 734-36 (2009) (Farah criticizes this
precondition. Moreover, Farah finds fault with the OECD arbitration article since it fails
to achieve the two main goals of double tax treaties: preventing double taxation and
preventing tax avoidance. Farah suggests a twofold evaluation test: first, a mandatory
and binding arbitration provision should achieve both goals and second, the provision
should operate so as to resolve tax disputes).
18. See, e.g., Hugh Ault, Improving the Resolution of International Tax Disputes, 7
FLA. TAX REV. 137, 140 (2005).
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If the competent authority cannot overcome the obstacle by itself, it
should implement the second stage of dispute resolution and resolve the
case “by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other
contracting state . . . .”19 It should be noted that if Article 25 is not
adopted in a double tax treaty, the taxpayer will be required to bring his
matter before the judiciaries in both contracting states.20 There is a
parallel authority to deal with the matter: the taxpayer can bring the case
before a local judiciary and simultaneously present it to his competent
authority.21 If so, the case may reach both a domestic and an
international resolution. Problems may arise naturally if the two
resolutions conflict. Another possible conflict between domestic and
international law may easily arise in the application of the mutual
agreement process.22 To avoid conflicts the taxpayer is usually required
to accept the mutual agreement and to withdraw his relevant domestic
lawsuit(s).23 Another quandary is whether the competent authority is
bound by its domestic law or free to deviate from it.24 Despite its
importance, however, this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
The mutual agreement process is the most commonly used
mechanism.25 Nevertheless, it has at least one serious drawback: mutual
agreement processes can take a long time to complete, and during this
time new complications may arise.26 Moreover, the procedure is costly
to both the contracting states and the taxpayer.27
Another shortcoming of MAP is where competent authorities follow
the mutual agreement procedure, but do not have to reach an agreement.
They are obliged to make their best effort to mutually agree on the case
but are under no obligation to reach a conclusion: their only duty is to
negotiate.28 This is perhaps the main drawback of the procedure, a
drawback Article 25(5) has been designed to remedy. Despite its
19. Article 25(2) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59.
20. See id. at C(25)-2, ¶ 7.
21. See id. at C(25)-1, ¶ 2.
22. See id. at C(25)-10 to -11, 13, 16-17, ¶¶. 27, 35, 42-43 (discussing some other
examples of conflict between the mutual agreement process and domestic law).
23. See id. at C(25)-17, ¶ 45.
24. See Ault, supra note 18, at 140-41.
25. See Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration in
Recent US Tax Conventions, 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 735, 750 (2012) (Ganguly examines the
pros and cons of the arbitration mechanism and concludes that, despite its merits, the
current formulation of arbitration in double tax treaties suffers from many weaknesses).
26. Id.; see also Ault, supra note 18, at 139.
27. See id. at 139 (discussing other potential costs).
28. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-14, ¶ 37.
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shortcoming the MAP is as aforesaid the default dispute resolution
mechanism in the OECD Model.
B. The Second Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Arbitration
Article 25(5) provides for arbitration in disputes originated by
Articles 25(1)-(2).29 It was added to the OECD Model in 2008 after
lengthy discussions30 and it is a quite common dispute resolution
mechanism in bilateral economic agreements.31
Arbitration is a dispute resolution process settled outside the court.32
The dispute is settled by a neutral third party — the arbitrator — who
adjudicates the disputed issue and his decision is both binding and
final.33
Article 25(5) added the practice of mandatory arbitration with the
reservation that “[i]n some states, national law, policy or administrative
considerations may not allow or justify the type of dispute resolution
envisaged under this paragraph . . . .”34 The taxpayer may initiate an
arbitration process if the mutual agreement process fails to end after two
years.35 The arbitration process is available to the taxpayer only when
29. Id. at C(25)-27, ¶ 73.
30. Before this amendment some OECD proposals were made. See OECD,
Improving the Process for Resolving International Tax Disputes (July 27, 2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/33629447.pdf [hereinafter OECD,
Improving the Process]; OECD, Proposals for Improving Mechanisms for the Resolution
of
Tax
Treaty
Disputes
(Feb.
2006),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/disputeresolution/36054823.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Tax Treaty
Disputes].
31. Seventy-five percent of international economic agreements provide for an
arbitration mechanism. This percentage is quite high relative to other international
agreements such as environmental, human rights, and security agreements. See Barbara
Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 201 (2007).
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
33. Id.
34. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-60 n.1, C(25)-24, ¶¶
65-67; see also William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in International Tax Arbitration,
in RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 35, 38-39 (1994) (discussing
the problem of enforcing the arbitral decision). On the other hand, Park also questions
the ability to challenge the arbitral decision on grounds of bias, excess of authority or
refusal to let one party present its case. Id.
35. McIntyre challenges this provision by believing that the taxpayer is not party to
the conflict and thus should not have the right to initiate the arbitration process. If
awarded this right, then reciprocity requires, at the very least, that competent authorities
have this right too. Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret
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the competent authority has initiated a mutual agreement process and the
tax problem has not been mutually resolved.36 That means that if
competent authorities have reached an agreement that is not to the
taxpayer’s satisfaction, he cannot bring his case to arbitration. This also
means that the arbitration process is only applicable for deadlocks and
naturally for cases which have been initially found justified by the
competent authority. Thus, arbitration is inapplicable if the competent
authority has refused to initiate a mutual agreement process in the first
place.37 Mandatory arbitration has mainly two advantages. First, it
forces a solution (since mutual agreement can end in a stalemate); and
second, it expedites the procedure.38
The arbitration settlement’s validity is somewhat limited. First, it is
only binding with regard to the particular matters submitted to
arbitration.39 Second, to avoid conflicting decisions, Article 25(5) states
that arbitration is not available if a domestic court has already resolved
the case.40
Although Article 25(5) embraces mandatory arbitration, the precise
arbitration procedure is not stipulated in the OECD Model, which leaves
it to mutual decision by the contracting states. Some believe that it is
inefficient for arbitrators to set up ad-hoc rules and that more detailed
guidelines should be provided,41 which are absent in the OECD model.
Indeed, some global organizations and NGOs have been supporting the
implementation of arbitration in cross-border transactions; these include
the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”),42 and
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).43 In 2000, the ICC’s
and Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622, 640
(2006). See also infra Part V.C.
36. See Article 25(5) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59
to 60.
37. See Farah, supra note 17, at 716, 734-36.
38. See Gustaf Lindencrona, Recent Development of Tax Treaty Arbitration, in
RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 3, 8 (1994); see also Züger,
supra note 2, at 65-108 (on mandatory arbitration).
39. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-30, ¶ 83.
40. See id. at C(25)-28, ¶ 76. In other cases, where the taxpayer is able to take his
case to domestic court after an arbitral decision, McIntyre believes the taxpayer should
bear the costs of arbitration and reimburse the competent authorities for wasted resources.
McIntyre, supra note 35, at 642-43.
41. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 35, at 641-42.
42. See
THE
LONDON
COURT
OF
INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION,
http://www.lcia.org/Default.aspx.
43. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org (The ICC
is an NGO established in 1919 to represent worldwide businesses and serve as the world

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3

8

1072

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

Commission on Taxation published a policy statement on Arbitration in
Tax Matters, 44 which can be easily adopted in bilateral tax treaties.
Within the mutual agreement process, other dispute resolutions can
be implemented on ad-hoc basis in lieu of the arbitration process.45 One
popular alternative is mediation. Since the OECD Model provides for
arbitration, however, we shall focus on this dispute resolution
mechanism in what follows.
C. The Merits Pros and Cons of Arbitration
For several decades now, scholars and practitioners have been
interested on how to resolve international tax disputes. Already in the
1951 Fifth Congress of the International Fiscal Association two main
mechanisms were suggested: an international judicial tax tribunal and
arbitration.46 This issue was not resolved in this congress and was raised
again in further discussions.47
This paper is not aimed at weighing the pros and cons of arbitration.
The aim of this brief, by no means exhaustive discussion is merely to
illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration. For the sake
of clarity, though, I will briefly elaborate on the matter.
The merits of arbitration can be compared to the main available
dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena – mutual
agreement and judiciary procedures. Although arbitration is
supplementary and substitutive of mutual agreement processes a brief
comparison of the two can highlight its merits.
Process finalization argument: Arbitration is similar to a judicial
decision and differs from mutual agreement in that that the conflict
business organization).
44. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Policy Statement for Arbitration in
International Tax Matters (May 3, 2000), http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-andRules/Document-centre/2002/Arbitration-in-International-Tax-Matters--BilateralConvention-Article/. Contra OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-36
to -43 (the Annex to Article 25 Commentary titled Sample Mutual Agreement on
Arbitration provides a sample form of agreement that competent authorities may use as a
basis for a mutual agreement to implement the arbitration process); but see Park, supra
note 34, at 48-49 (providing that an international tax arbitration clause should include
five elements: (1) applicable procedural rules; (2) the mechanism for determining the
arbitrator fees; (3-4) the place and language of arbitration, and (5) the number of
arbitrators).
45. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-31, ¶86.
46. Lindencrona, supra note 38, at 3.
47. Id.
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reaches an award. In this sense, both arbitration and judiciary processes
are preferable to mutual agreement process.48
Neutrality argument: In addition, international arbitration is
preferable to mutual agreement since the outcome is based on an
independent forum rather than on interested and biased authorities, which
prioritize the interests of their state.49 Independent arbitrators can
overcome the biased advantage given to the host state, which serves at
the same time as a “party, regulator, legislator and adjudicator.”50 Where
large-scale trading and financial activities conducted by multinational
enterprises are involved, each state has an interest not to lose its
economic share.51
Although the amendment of the OECD Model’s Article 25 includes
arbitration as a cumulative dispute resolution mechanism, the more
material comparison is between arbitration and judiciary procedures as
discussed below.
Efficiency argument: One apparent advantage of arbitration is cost
and time saving52 relative to the regular judicial process.53 Arbitration is
free of procedural and evidentiary rules and thus considered an efficient
dispute resolution mechanism.54 Moreover, the arbitral decision is final
and the parties cannot appeal it, which means it is significantly more
cost-effective55 (albeit at the expense of fairness, as discussed below).56
This apparent advantage is not absolute, however. Recently, significant
progress has been achieved in allowing some arbitration decisions to be

48. See also id. at 8.
49. See, e.g., Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar
"Resolution of Tax Treaty Conflicts by Arbitration", in RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY
CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 61, 62 (1994).
50. This quotation was mentioned with regard to investment treaty arbitration. See
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 47, 71-72 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Nature and Enforcement].
51. See Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407, 1408 n.4 (2012)
(It is estimated that sixty percent of global trade is carried out by multinational
enterprises).
52. See Park, supra note 34, at 36; Ganguly, supra note 25, at 751-52 (Ganguly
weighs the pros and cons of arbitration to resolve the double taxation problem and
believes that, despite the merits of arbitration, its current formulation in double tax
treaties suffers from many disadvantages).
53. See supra note 38.
54. Ganguly, supra note 25, at 746-47.
55. Id. at 746.
56. Id.
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appealed.57 This is not the normal procedure, but given its availability it
would be overly simplified to state that arbitration awards are completely
final.
Neutrality argument: Another advantage in the international arena is
the neutral nature of arbitration. It seems that when a conflict arises
between taxpayer X, resident of state X, and Y, resident of state Y and
taxpayer X will often be reluctant to litigate in state Y and vice versa.
Thus, arbitration is more politically and procedurally neutral.58
Fairness and confidentiality argument: It seems that the Achilles
heel of the OECD arbitration mechanism is its secrecy. In other words,
the main drawback of arbitration and mutual agreement procedures59
compared to judicial procedures is lack of transparency. The public has
access to court verdicts and can scrutinize the outcome of the process.60
This not only gives the public a better understanding of the law and its
implementation, but also provides legal precedents for later disputes.61
Conversely, international tax arbitration is totally obscure from the
public.62 The arbitration process, including its final decision, is not open
57. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, OPTIONAL APPELLATE
ARBITRATION
RULES
(November
1,
2013),
available
at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2016218.
58. See Park, supra note 34, at 36.
59. Most mutual agreement procedure documents in the United States are not open
to the public (for a more detailed classification of competent authority resolutions, see
Christians, supra note 51, at 1433-34; McIntyre, supra note 35, at 631 ("The single most
objectionable feature of the OECD Proposal is its provision for total secrecy.”)).
McIntyre criticizes the OECD Proposal for Improving Mechanisms for the Resolution of
Tax Treaty Disputes (2006) mainly for the arbitration process' confidentiality and the
unnecessarily costly process in cases of double non-taxation, most of which are transfer
pricing cases which can be dealt within the improved OECD transfer pricing rules.
McIntyre, supra note 35, at 627-29. Since arbitration is costly, McIntyre suggests
limiting the mandatory arbitration mechanism to double taxation cases only and to the
exclusion of double non-taxation. Id. at 646. He finds no rationale in mandatory
arbitration in cases that result in increasing international tax avoidance. McIntyre notes
other flaws in the proposal that can, however, be easily remedied. Id. at 638-46.
60. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 751.
61. This argument is applied to domestic judicial courts, despite being applicable,
mutatis mutandis, to international judicial courts as well. See Christians, supra note 51, at
1430-31.
62. Christians claims that "the international tax arbitration process is designed to be
completely inaccessible to the public. In other words, international tax arbitration is
intentionally designed not to produce international tax law." See Christians, supra note
51, at 1437 (Christians demonstrates how "soft law" in international tax disputes involves
high social costs. Soft institutional mechanisms in the international tax regime disguise
relevant information from the public. Citizens of each nation thus lack information about
the allocation of global revenues. They cannot be aware if their government claims less
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for disclosure. When decisions are confidential they cannot guide others
in future disputes, thus impairing the development of customary law.63
The main counter-argument to this is the efficiency argument discussed
above.64
Confidentiality has another aspect, though. A confidential
adjudicative process is a fertile ground for corruption. When parties
cannot review the process it is easier to act dishonestly.65 This problem
can be minimized if the parties to the secret process are private selfinterested parties that have an incentive to expose dishonesty when their
money is at stake. On the other hand, when the parties are states and the
money at stake is public funds, this incentive is fairly insignificant.66
Sovereignty argument: Arbitration impairs state sovereignty since
internal tax revenue decisions are being resolved by third parties — the
arbitrators.67 Since resolving some international tax conflicts requires
domestic law interpretation, some scholars argue that interpretation
should be left to domestic courts and not to any international third
party.68 This claim has some truth to it, although it is valid also to MAPs
and judiciary procedures (even domestic courts) since globalization
interferes with sovereignty. On the other hand, since the dispute
concerns only one taxpayer and only his tax liability and not the truly
national matters, this interference is somewhat negligible.69
Harmonization v. Inconsistency argument: If one focuses on the
specific dispute, we have seen that arbitration carries many advantages in
terms of quick and efficient resolution. However, if one considers the
general system beyond the specific individual, an international court may
be preferable. Not only can such a court develop legal tax rules as
discussed under the fairness and confidentiality argument, but its
byproduct can be tax harmonization.70 Though, even for an individual,
of the global income and thus levies them more heavily. Without this relevant
information, it is impractical to assess tax policy on either efficiency or fairness
principles. Therefore, the author aims at examining the social cost of obscurity in
international tax regime).
63. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 771; see also McIntyre, supra note 35, at 632.
64. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
65. McIntyre, supra note 35, at 626, 632.
66. Id. at 626, 636.
67. See, e.g., Ganguly, supra note 25, at 752; Farah, supra note 17, at 709.
68. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 35, at 626 (adding that "The OECD seems to
recognize that an international tribunal should not act as a court of review for the
decisions of domestic courts.").
69. Ganguly, supra note 25, at 753.
70. In Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
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arbitration may be troublesome since there are various arbitral tribunals
that can reach inconsistent outcomes. This inconsistency not only
interferes with harmonization but also with certainty – a vital feature in
economic activities.71
Some scholars conclude that despite the drawbacks of arbitration,72
it can serve as the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism with some
modifications.73 This article’s basic approach is that no dispute
resolution mechanism is perfect, and it does not attempt to settle the
question which mechanism is better on either efficiency or neutrality
grounds. Instead, this article examines whether the dispute resolution
mechanisms proposed by the OECD Model should treat the taxpayer as a
party to the dispute. After this discussion this paper may be less
undecided as to which mechanism is preferable, but in order to answer
this question, some light needs to be shed on the nature of international
717, 724 (2012), Rosenzweig treats international taxation as a public good and claims it
is misleading to support greater cooperation between countries in the international tax
arena. Bilateral treaties, which mainly exclude small states (often offshore tax havens),
do not enhance international cooperation. Id. at 721-24. On the contrary, in excluding
these tax havens they actually compromise cooperation. Id. at 725. Therefore,
Rosenzweig suggests new mechanisms, such as a "lottery" mechanism, to induce those
small countries to cooperate. Id. at 726, 755-57. Conversely, in Yariv Brauner,
Integration in an Integrating World, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 51 (2005), Brauner supports
international coordination. According to Brauner, the underlying reason for favoring this
coordination is the imputation system. Id. This system is preferable to two-tier taxation.
Brauner claims that, although many countries have abandoned the imputation system due
to globalization, the integration system can be reintroduced through international
coordination of tax policies. Id. at 85-90. Likewise, in Anthea Roberts, Clash of
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J.
INT'L L. 45, 62 (2013), Roberts believes that international courts generally have the power
to create substantive law.
71. See Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 56-58 (This flaw
was mentioned with regard to bilateral investment treaties); see also Susan D. Franck,
The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1525, 1558 (2005)
[hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy Crisis]. However, Franck notes that inconsistency has
some advantages, such as highlighting the legal "flaws within the system." Franck, The
Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 68; see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, at 1612-13.
72. See Farah, supra note 17, at 749 ("Scholars have raised additional concerns
regarding issues such as the selection of the arbitration panel, implementation of the
arbitration decision and conflicts with domestic laws, time limitations, precedential value
of the decisions, taxpayer participation in the proceedings, the binding aspect of the
decision to the States and to the taxpayer, appointing the arbitrators, review of the
arbitration decision, the costs and expenses of the proceeding, legal status of the treaty
and commentary and, the language of the arbitration.").
73. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 772; see also McIntyre, supra note 35, at 636-37
(suggesting seven factors to consider in order to determine whether arbitration is suitable
as a dispute resolution mechanism).
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tax law.
IV. The Hybrid Elements of International Taxation and Its Applications
The issue of the appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms in
international taxation has received wide resonance.74 Nevertheless, if we
wish to design the optimal dispute resolution instrument we have to fully
understand what international taxation is. Although the vast literature on
international taxation is somewhat lacking, recently this topic has
received attention with regards to investment treaties, discussed below.75
Though, this tax literature attempting to resolve double tax conflicts
lacks a detailed analysis of classification of international taxation.
If an international tax regime does exist, is it part of international
law?76 Avi-Yonah believes not only that there is such a regime (partly
given the numerous and similar bilateral tax treaties), but also that it is
part of international law. Avi-Yonah argues that it relies on two
principles: the single tax principle (meaning that a given income is taxed
once; no double taxation but also no double non-taxation) and the
benefits principle (meaning that active income should be taxed at source
and passive income at residence).77 This approach is controversial,
however, with some scholars believing that there is no international tax
regime and thus countries are sovereign to adopt any international tax
rule they prefer.78 For the purposes of this article, it will not be
necessary to determine whether international tax law exists or not,
though the hybrid form is emphasized.
Although the categorization of law is somewhat archaic, we still
tend to classify fields of law to enhance our analysis. Two common pairs
of distinctions are between international and national law, and private
and public international law. International taxation, or more specifically
international double tax conventions, carries elements of both
international and national law, and public and private international law.
First, in the international arena, tax treaties are tangential to public
international law, which covers agreements and conventions between
74. See generally Farah, supra note 17; Ganguly, supra note 25; Lindencrona,
supra note 38; Park, supra note 34.
75. For the development of investment treaties, see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis,
supra note 71, at 1525.
76. See generally AVI-YONAH, supra note 9.
77. See id. at 9-13, 182.
78. See references in id. at 1.
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states (jus inter gentes). More precisely, international tax treaties are
conventional international agreements and are thus one of the main
sources of public international law. Those treaties are mainly based on
OECD or UN models and thus share similarities (even in the order of the
articles).79 Moreover, countries have to amend domestic laws in order to
apply general rules set by the OECD (such as transfer pricing
guidelines).80 Interestingly, although this is beyond the scope of this
article, some claim that customary international tax law exists.81 The
main justification for a customary international tax regime is that some
tax rules are ubiquitous. For example, the nondiscrimination rule
(Article 24 of the OECD Model)82 and the arm’s-length principles
(adopted in Article 9)83 are applicable in international transactions even
when a double tax treaty is not.84
Second, international tax law also has similarities to private
international taxation85 since it involves, among other factors, a “foreign”
element, although it is naturally not identical to private international law.
From the taxpayer perspective it is indeed a private matter that in the
case of double taxation involves two conflicting tax jurisdictions that can
govern the dispute.86
Third, international tax law naturally involves domestic law since
double tax treaties adopt many mechanisms from internal law. For
example, taxpayer’s residency is always determined by domestic law87
(unless there is double residence).88 In addition, the treaty becomes part
of domestic law either automatically (the monism approach) or after a
process of declaration or ratification (the dualism approach). According
to the latter, each country applies different rules on how to adopt a treaty
into the domestic law. Nevertheless, eventually the treaty is adopted by
79. See id. at 3.
80. See, e.g., id. at 4.
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See, e.g., id. at 6.
83. See, e.g., id. at 6-7, 102-23.
84. Avi-Yonah gives many other examples of tax rules that can be viewed as part of
customary international law, such as the residence rule and CFC rules. Id. at 23, 25.
85. On the interesting historical private-public international law dichotomy in legal
positivism, see M. W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 61, 61-64 (1984).
86. For an example regarding private international law, see JAMES FAWCETT &
JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Peter North ed., 14th ed.
2008).
87. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at R(19)-31, ¶104.
88. See id.
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domestic law and is legally binding.
As stated above, the tax literature on double taxation lacks a
thorough analysis of international tax nature. However, such a
discussion has been conducted recently alongside the growth89 of
investment treaties (with regard to investment treaties). Investment
treaties are officially aimed at encouraging and promoting mutual foreign
investments between the contracting states.90 They encourage the
transfer of capital between the signatory’s states and contribute mainly to
host states and private investors.91 Investment treaties serve as an
economic charter for investors by protecting their capital, but they also
economically assist states to develop their infrastructures.92
Theoretically, when a dispute arises within an investment treaty, the
potential law that can be used to resolve it may be either the local law of
the host state, the treaty itself or general principles of public international
law.93 Therefore, some scholars believe that the system generated by
investment treaties is sui generis.94 Because the investor has private
interests in the success of his investment, investment treaties are a hybrid
system that absorbs private law into the public sphere.95 To put it
somewhat differently, an international treaty between two sovereign
states governed by international law embraces to its sphere a private
dispute.96 Some analogizes this composition of laws to a “unique
marriage” or a “vertical culture clash”.97
Although I do believe that international tax law is a hybrid system,
89. Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the amount of investment treaties has been
increasingly growing and amounted to 2,265 treaties in 2003. Also, during 2002, double
tax treaties were over 2,000 and totaled to 2,256. Quantitative Data on Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE
AND
DEVELOPMENT
[UNCTAD],
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/
Quantitative-data-on-bilateral-investment-treaties-and-double-taxation-treaties.aspx.
90. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 151, 157 (2012); Douglas, supra note 3, at 201;
see also Preamble to 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
(stating that the signatory states desire to achieve greater economic cooperation with
regard to investments).
91. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1527.
92. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 48-49, 52-53.
93. Douglas, supra note 3, at 194.
94. Id. at 189.
95. See, e.g., id.
96. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 69.
97. See Roberts, supra note 70, at 54-55 and references therein.
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as elaborated at the preface of this Part, I suppose we cannot adopt
directly the analysis concerning investment treaties since it has some
substantive dissimilarities. First, the two treaties differ in their direct and
short-term goals. Obviously, the resident state signed an investment
treaty aiming at protecting its resident private investments, though this
interest is only indirect and depends on how this investment would
eventually echo its own economy.98 When a dispute arises the core issue
is a private commercial interest.99 Whereas, double tax treaties aim at
reducing double taxation, the interest of the resident state is not directly
to protect private taxpayers but to preserve the state’s treasury. Second,
and also very significant for our later discussion in this paper, investment
treaties in many cases expressly recognize the independent procedural
and substantive rights of an investor to resolve his claim in a potential
dispute.100 These similar rights for taxpayers are usually absent from
double tax treaties. Third, investment treaties are not necessarily
bilateral, some are multilateral,101 while a double tax treaty is so far only
a bilateral treaty. In addition, even when it is bilateral it specifically
stipulates as aforesaid the parties to the disputes, i.e., a dispute between
the host state and the private investor not like in double tax treaties.
Despite the above divergence, international tax disputes are also of
a special kind. International taxation is thus an amalgam of different
legal fields and diverse norms that may involve the interests of
conflicting states and ultimately taxpayers.
V.

De Facto and De Jure Parties to International Tax Disputes

A. Identifying Conflicting Interests and Parties
Clearly, in an international tax dispute the taxpayer subject to
double or non-taxation has a vested interest in the outcome of the
dispute. Each contracting state also has an economic interest in the
dispute resolution process since it is supposed to safeguard its state
treasury.
In the international arena, therefore, the conflict may be tripartite —
between both contracting states, and between the taxpayer and each

98. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 3, at 172.
99. See, e.g., id. at 237.
100. See discussion infra notes 127-30.
101. Roberts, supra note 70, at 53; see discussion infra note 109.
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state.102 The conflict resolution mechanisms currently offered in the
OECD Model Convention treats the problem mainly as a procedural one
between states103 and grants only the taxpayer the right to initiate
procedures by: first, mutual agreement procedures where he serves only
as an observer104 and second, arbitration where he may present his case
but not choose the arbitrators. The taxpayer is a participant who may
submit his case in writing and can be orally heard before the
arbitrators.105 Moreover, he is not authorized to sue either state for
violating or breaching a certain article.106 To be even more precise, the
arbitration process commences only when a mutual agreement process
has been initiated. Recall that this process is subject to the full
discretionary power of the competent authorities. In that respect, the
taxpayer’s role in dispute resolution is fairly passive although he is an
integral part of the conflict. On the other hand, in some bilateral
investment treaties taxpayers who believe that the hosting country has

102. See Luc Hinnekens, Legal Sources and Interpretation of European Tax
Arbitration Convention and its Recognition of the Taxpayer, in RESOLUTION OF TAX
TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 11, 25 (1994) (Hinnekens treats the dispute as
"almost a tri-party procedure" and endeavors to define taxpayer's rights on the basis of
the European Tax Arbitration Convention); see also Christians, supra note 51, at 1423
(Christians claims, "[i]t also demonstrates that there are several parties to an international
tax dispute that have different stakes in the outcome, namely, the taxpayer and the
multiple governments that have laid justifiable, if overlapping, jurisdictional claims.").
103. See Hinnekens, supra note 102, at 25 (contending that the question of
taxpayer's legal position is not relevant in mutual agreement procedure but only in
arbitration where the issue is not merely diplomatic but also has a jurisdictional nature).
104. "The taxpayer initiates an international tax dispute by bringing a claim to a
competent authority, but it is the competent authorities alone that directly engage in the
dispute and its resolution. The taxpayer is interested in having the governments resolve
the problem, but once the claim has been laid, the taxpayer's role becomes one of
observer, at best." Christians, supra note 51, at 1424.
105. See OECD, Tax Treaty Disputes, supra note 30, at ¶ 76 ("Whilst the mutual
agreement procedure involves a government-to-government relation, when the process
moves to arbitration, the person who presented the case is more of a direct participant.
This is especially the case since the arbitration decision will be binding on each State as
regards the taxation of that person. Thus, it seems appropriate that the person be able to
participate to some degree directly in the arbitration process, though the process would
remain under the control of the competent authorities."). Moreover, section 11 of the
Annex to Article 25 Commentary titled "Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration"
states: "The person who made the request for arbitration may, either directly or through
his representatives, present his position to the arbitrators in writing to the same extent that
he can do so during the mutual agreement procedure. In addition, with the permission of
the arbitrators, the person may present his position orally during the arbitration
proceedings". OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-40, ¶ 11.
106. Christians, supra note 51, at 1423.
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compromised their investment are authorized to sue it directly.107
It is interesting to see that in the investment treaty arena the direct
conflict is bilateral but not necessarily between contracting states. Some
investment treaties treat the conflict as a conflict between the two
contracting states;108 but many others consider the conflict as a conflict
between the investor of one contracting state and the host state.109
Therefore, despite treating the second alternative as a bilateral conflict, it
is a conflict between a private person and a sovereign state (the host
state). Investment treaties grant investors with some substantive rights
and procedural rights to “address violations of those substantive
rights”.110 Investment treaty arbitration in that case is carried out
between unequal parties where the investor is usually the one who
initiates the arbitral procedure.111
B. The Apparent Solution
After indicating the interests of the parties at stake, we should
readdress Article 25. Article 25 considers the conflict as bilateral and
regulates the procedure between states.112 Apparently, though, the
proposed resolution mechanisms do not approach the conflict as it should
be. First, it should be treated as trilateral and second, it should take into
account the fact that encompasses elements from both public and private
inter-national law (and not mainly from public international law).
The dispute is not merely a matter of contracting states disputing
how to allocate revenues between them. It also involves the taxpayer
(either an enterprise or an individual). Eventually it is the latter which
bears the burden of double taxation.113
If we accept that the international tax conflict is multiform and

107. See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009); Christians, supra note 51, at 1423; see
also AVI-YONAH, supra note 9, at 1.
108. As referred by Douglas the "state/state sphere." See Douglas, supra note 3, at
189.
109. As referred by Douglas the "investor/state sphere." Id. Most treaties recognize
investor rights to bring directly an arbitral claim. Roberts, supra note 70, at 50.
110. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1529; Roberts, supra note 70,
at 60.
111. See Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential
Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 87, 89 (2012).
112. See Lindencrona, supra note 38, at 5.
113. See Hinnekens, supra note 102, at 11.
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carries elements from both international and national law and from both
public and to some extent private international law, we have to examine
whether the taxpayer has standing in each legal field. In other words, the
question is whether the taxpayer has the “right to make a legal claim or
seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right”.114
Needless to say, if we consider the tax conflict as a domestic or
private international law conflict, then a taxpayer has standing — he can
easily demonstrate that he will suffer financially if the dispute resolution
outcome does not redress double taxation. In both legal fields,
individuals have private interests in the matter and can bring their case
before national courts. Naturally, after meeting some procedural
requirements taxpayers can sue the tax authorities in domestic courts.
The problem may arise in public international law, however.
Recall that double tax treaties also carry elements of international
law. Although individuals have some role to play in international law,
traditionally its subjects have been only states. Gradually the scope of
subjects of international law has been growing. Especially after World
War II new actors entered into the international arena.115 As a result,
modern public international law recognizes that individuals may be also
independent subjects thereof.116 This means that individuals have legal
personality in international law, mainly, though not exclusively, in the
human rights area.117 We may thus conclude that in both legal fields at
stake — the national and international — the taxpayer has certain rights
to be heard.
This conclusion is, however, somewhat misleading since the scope
of individual rights and obligations in the international sphere is
somewhat limited. It should be emphasized that I do not claim that in
international law there is complete overlap between being a subject and
being a court party of international law. Still in the international field,

114. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed., 2009) for definition of
"standing".
115. See Janis, supra note 85.
116. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (6th ed. 2008) (As Shaw
states "[p]ersonality in international law necessitates the consideration of the
interrelationship between rights and duties afforded under the international system and
capacity to enforce claims…. International personality is participation plus some form of
community acceptance.").
117. See, e.g., id. at 258; see also Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the
International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 535 (1956) (claiming that
"[t]he subjects of international law may be defined as persons to whom international law
attributes rights and duties directly and not through the medium of their states.").
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not only are individuals not always able to sue,118 but in many cases even
the case cannot be brought by other parties to any international court.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, this tendency is changing mainly in
the human rights area, where it would seem that individuals are
increasingly considered to have both obligations and rights deriving from
general international rules.119 In some instances individuals can even
take the case directly to court. This has been possible since the 1998
European Convention on Human Rights, which authorizes individual
victims to sue the violent member state in the European Court of Human
Rights.120 Since the court’s establishment more than 10,000 judgments
have been given121 (this individual right to sue is also granted before the
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights).122 Some claim that this
progress should also expand to obligations in civil international law.123 It
should be noted, that some scholars believe that individual’s independent
standing in investment disputes derives from the field of human rights.124
Since the inclination in international law is to expand individual
rights and since there is a growing tendency to recognize individual
rights in international sphere, one can claim that this tendency should be
expanded also to international tax law.
118. As Shaw notes "[i]ndividuals as a general rule lack standing to assert
violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the state of nationality,
although states may agree to confer particular rights on individuals which will be
enforceable under international law, independently of municipal law." SHAW, supra note
116, at 258.
119. See Andrew Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21
EUR. J. INT'L L. 25, 27 (2010).
120. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art 34, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. ("The Court may
receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation [sic] or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties
of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.").
121. Over 150,000 applications have been brought before the judicial formation
(the pre-judicial stage). See In Facts and Figures 2011, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (Jan. 2012),
available
at
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/files/FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2
012_VERSION_WEB.pdf.
122. The court was officially founded in 2006 by virtue of the Protocol of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights. African Court in Brief, AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND
PEOPLES'
RIGHTS,
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-court/briefhistory. The Court is bound to protect the rights adopted by the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights. Id.; see also, Clapham, supra note 119, at 28.
123. Clapham, supra note 119, at 28.
124. See, e.g. , Douglas, supra note 3, at 185-86.
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This conclusion receives wide support from the investment treaty
literature, which bears some similarities to double tax treaties.125 It is
claimed that since investment treaties carry elements from both
international and national law and private and public law it creates a new
unique system.126 When a dispute arises within the investment treaty
scope, one can differentiate between two spheres: a conflict between two
states or a conflict between a state and a private investor.127 Today,
investment treaties assign investors a direct and independent right in
international disputes. In the private-state sphere the investor is a direct
party with full standing in the dispute resolution.128 If the host state did
not fulfill its obligations and damaged his investment, the investor has a
personal right to bring a claim against the tortfeasor, i.e., the host state.
The investor here is analogized to a “private attorney general”129 since a
private person from the resident state may carry out by himself an
international dispute against the host state.130
In the short run we saw that the individual taxpayer has incentives
to be party to the dispute. He has an incentive to be heard and influence
the outcome. In the long run it is not simply the interest of the specific
taxpayer but also of potential future taxpayers who may face a similar
double taxation problem. Ignoring the taxpayer’s direct interests in this
conflict may deter some businesses from carrying on international
125. Though the two kind of treaties also differ from each other see the discussion
infra note 97.
126. See, e.g., id. at 185-86, 189, 193; Roberts, supra note 70, at 50 (In this article,
Roberts criticizes the common paradigms in investment treaty analysis. In order to
understand the nature of investment treaties, it is common to compare it to other legal
fields. The ordinary analogies are taken for example from public international law,
international commercial arbitration law, domestic public law (including administrative
and constitutional laws) and international public law (including human rights and trade
law). Each of them has pros and cons in analyzing investment treaties. These paradigms
do not fall in line and in many instances collide due to different structure, assumptions
and inherent norms).
127. Douglas, supra note 3, at 189.
128. See, e.g., Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the
Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 498
(2009). Kaushal reviews the historical development of investment treaty arbitration.
Kaushal reveals that states gave up their sovereignty in order to enhance investor rights
and property rights. Kaushal argues that this outcome blurred the distinction between
national and international law and between private and public law. Id. at 514-23.
Additionally, Kaushal claims that this blur between the private and the public sphere
caused part of the public sphere to privatize and thus to reduce private rights. Id. at 51932.
129. See, Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1538.
130. Id.
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economic activity. Protecting the individual taxpayer should concern
both contracting states, as both are interested in promoting economic
growth and efficiency. The remaining question is whether we need to
treat him as a party to do so.
C. The Normative Solution
So far I assumed the taxpayer has a legitimate interest to be heard in
the “international” dispute. In other words, I assumed he is a third active
party. From an institutional perspective he is a third party and naturally
the resolution impacts him primarily and directly. Accordingly, he
should have full standing since his rights are recognized and protected
not only in national law where he can sue tax authorities but also within
the scope of international law. This analysis was based on the
presumption that double tax treaties are amalgam of various legal fields.
But does he really have standing? Some scholars believe that due to the
extraneous interests of the business community he is a “non-party” and
should be only an observer.131 The OECD proposal addresses this
question too, stating that the taxpayer should participate in the arbitration
process though the process will only be conducted by the signatory
states.132 I too believe that in many cases he should not appear before the
court as a third interested party, but my reasoning differs.
It is true that international tax conflicts involve hybrid
characteristics of both national and international law. The discussion so
far excluded a normative perspective. The approach was institutional,
assuming that since an individual can be party to a dispute in both
international and national law and since he naturally has an interest in the
outcome, he should have standing. Both legal spheres support and
recognize the private rights of a person – the taxpayer.
However, if one introduces to the international tax discourse
equitable rationales well established in legal tradition, the apparent
solution will no longer be valid. If we introduce the discourse of
principles and if the overarching objective is to prevent double taxation
and even double non-taxation, we will reach a different conclusion where
a taxpayer has no say in the dispute.
The first task is to present the relevant international principles. One

131. See McIntyre, supra note 35, at 639-40.
132. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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major principle governing international law is good faith,133 as articulated
in Article 2(2) of the United Nations Charter.134 This principle is
elaborated135 in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States.136 Thus,
the principle of good faith should be applicable to meeting an existing
obligation.137
The principle derived from the above declaration is the duty of
states to cooperate. Although this duty is broad138 it can highlight the
duty of contracting states to negotiate in the case of the mutual
agreement process discussed above. It can guide the contracting states
not only to negotiate but also to endeavor in good faith to cooperate and
reach a conclusion. Another international principle is the equity
principle introduced by international courts;139 although, “[e]quity has
been used by the courts as a way of mitigating certain inequities, not as a
method of refashioning nature to the detriment of legal rules.”140
The good faith and equity principles are relevant to the discussion
here. Good faith is a vague concept that defies straightforward
definition. Since it is an equitable principle,141 though, I will refer to
both jointly as “the outer equitable principle”.
In the private arena and more specifically in the domestic tax field,
the equity principle was interpreted as the ability-to-pay principle.
Although not controversial per se,142 the contents of equity under tax law
attracted significant attention in the literature. The prevailing principle
133. SHAW, supra note 116, at 103-04.
134. UN Charter art. 2, para. 2 ("All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.").
135. SHAW, supra note 116, at 104.
136. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970).
137. SHAW, supra note 116, at 104.
138. VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2007).
139. SHAW, supra note 116, at 105-07.
140. Moreover, "[i]ts existence, therefore, as a separate and distinct source of law is
at best highly controversial." Id. at 107.
141. In explaining the concept of "good faith" under Section 205 of the Restatement
(Second), Summers suggests that this concept ". . . is of a piece with explicit
requirements of 'contractual morality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various
general equitable principles." See Robert S. Summers, General Duty of Good Faith – Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
142. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 12
(2002).
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applied both in scholarly discussion and in practice, 143 designed to
accomplish the equity goal, is the ability-to-pay principle.144 The essence
of this principle is that tax liability should follow individual well-being.
A well-off person should pay more taxes than a poor person. Utilitarian
views tried to conceptualize the ability-to-pay principle145 in at least two
ways.146 First, a person with higher income can pay more taxes since his
marginal utility from money diminishes. Second, a person with high
income is able to sacrifice a larger portion of his income, since he simply
has more to spend than the poor. The ability-to-pay principle was
interpreted into tax law by progressive tax rates – people with higher
income are subject to higher tax rates. Thus, the principle should guide
policy makers in designing tax rules, and as it reflects equitable treatment
among taxpayers, I refer to it as the “inner equitable principle”.
If one seeks to accomplish an equitable result according to both the
outer and inner equitable principles, the taxpayer should not have a “de
jure standing”. The analysis rests on the assumption or even the axiom
that contracting states are obliged to reduce double taxation and trusted
to act accordingly. As explained in the foreword to the OECD Model the
main aim of bilateral double tax treaties is to overcome the well-known
distortive effect of double taxation in international transactions. And as
stated, “[t]his is the main purpose of the OECD Model Tax Convention
on Income and on Capital, which provides a means of settling on a
uniform basis the most common problems that arise in the field of
international judicial double taxation.”147
An example can clarify this claim. Let us assume that person X, a
citizen and resident of state X, generates income in state Y. Both states
have signed a double tax treaty based on the OECD Model. If State X
applies the residence-based regime and State Y does not exempt income
produced in its territory from tax, a classical double taxation problem
will arise. Let us moreover assume that this is a case of full double

143. For the prevalence of the ability-to-pay principle, see id. at 20.
144. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 61-66 (4th ed. 2008).
145. John G. Head, Tax-Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical, and
Practical Review, in FAIRNESS IN TAXATION 10 (Allan M. Maslove ed. 1993).
146. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 24.
147. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at I-1, ¶ 3 and RICHARD E.
ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶¶ 1.01-1.01[1] (2013),
which states that there are two main purposes for double tax treaties. The first is to
overcome the double tax problem to facilitate cross border trade and the second to enable
the contracting states to enforce tax collection.
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taxation. For simplification, we can also assume that the income incurred
is one hundred dollars and the tax rate on this income in each state is a
flat tax of thirty percent. So his tax liability in each state is thirty dollars.
Therefore cumulatively he will be required to pay sixty dollars in tax
(meaning paying the tax twice). Applying the inner equitable principle
means that it is inequitable to tax the taxpayer twice for the same income.
Moreover, if states are fully committed to cooperating and eliminating
double taxation and implementing the outer equitable principle, the
taxpayer has nothing to contribute. If both countries in my example are
compelled to reduce double taxation and divide between them thirty
dollars — the taxpayer has nothing to contribute to the discussion. It is
merely a conflict between the contracting states on how to allocate the
tax among them, with the proviso that the taxpayer should be taxed only
once according to the inner equitable principle, i.e., to his ability to pay.
If the case at stake is not a double taxation but rather a double nontaxation case the analysis should remain the same. If a taxpayer
structures his transaction in a manner that takes advantage of the
different tax rules of state X and Y he may benefit from low taxes or
even avoid taxation altogether (i.e., double non-taxation). This tax
arbitrage also means that the taxpayer is not taxed with accordance to his
ability and that states should determine between themselves (perhaps
with the help of arbitrators)148 how to fully tax him and allocate his
liability between them. Here again, the relevant parties are only the
contracting states. The problem that may arise, though, is that according
to the current OECD model, the taxpayer is the only one empowered to
launch the arbitral process. Since, as I claim, he has no de jure standing,
the taxpayer should be deprived of the right to initiate the arbitral
process, which should be left to the contracting states.
To conclude, each state is obliged by its own jurisdiction and norms
to implement the inner equitable principle; each state is also obliged to
implement the outer equitable principle when the state is party to an
international case. Since international tax disputes carry both national
and international elements, both principles should be employed. If the
tax dispute reaches a MAP then the contracting states ought to follow
those principles by themselves. If, on the other hand, the conflict reaches
international arbitration or judiciary this task is left to either the
international arbitrators or the judges. In any case, due to its hybrid
nature, the international tax conflict should be resolved according to both

148. For the advantages of arbitration, see supra Part III.C.
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the inner and outer equitable principles. The discussion so far stipulates
the parties to the dispute, though has been salient with regard to the
proper dispute resolution mechanism.
VI. Food for Thought
The foregoing discussion suggests one recommendation. After
arguing that a taxpayer’s active participation in an international tax
dispute resolution process is unnecessary I could have stopped at that.
The other (state) parties required to uphold the normative equity
principle could reach a proper resolution. However, you may recall the
discussion in an earlier part where I compared the pros and cons of
arbitration relative to MAP and the judicial process. If we ignore the
technical (though not unimportant) matter of financing a tax tribunal (or
even a permanent arbitrator panel) and after comparing the various
international tax conflict resolution mechanism and taking into account
the hybrid character of international taxation, I believe that a body
composed of tax experts is the preferable dispute resolution mechanism.
I believe that such a body could better implement the tax norms
(including the inner and the outer equitable principles) than
representatives of the tax authorities of the contracting states in an MAP.
Accordingly, a body composed of tax experts — either a tax
tribunal or an arbitrator panel – is preferable to MAP. But could we
argue in favor of one of the bodies? Could we tip the scales in the
lengthy discussion in favor of one of the above-mentioned mechanisms?
Recall the former characterization of international taxation. Part IV
discussed the hybrid elements of international taxation. Apparently, this
classification contributed to my discussion by examining the taxpayer’s
active participation in dispute resolution. The apparent solution
indicated that the taxpayer should be an active participant in the process;
however, this apparent solution was overruled by the normative analysis.
But if I return to the question that has troubled many scholars — which
dispute resolution mechanism is preferable for resolving international tax
conflicts — the analysis should lead in the opposite direction. If I ignore
for the sake of discussion the taxpayer’s participation in the process and
focus only on the arbitration-versus-adjudication issue, then the
normative aspect so vital to my analysis will lose its relevance. If we are
dealing with tax experts — either arbitrators or judges — who are able to
internalize the equity principle in their ruling, then both are equally
qualified from a normative perspective and the normative analysis loses
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its relevance. The technical solution, however, based directly on the
hybrid form of international taxation can shed further light on the
discussion and favor a permanent tribunal (rather than an ad-hoc
arbitration).149 A permanent tribunal can enhance the international
quality of international taxation by developing customary law and as a
byproduct promote tax harmonization. An ad-hoc body that also does
not disclose its decisions cannot produce and uphold international tax
law.150
VII. Conclusion
After briefly noting the hybrid elements of international tax treaties,
I discussed the normative question. How should we resolve disputes
when a double tax treaty does not help a taxpayer avoid double taxation
and both contracting states insist on their complete share? I suggest that
this normatively hybrid legal field deserves a different analysis to resolve
the conflicting private and national interests involved. I believe that the
response to this question is crucial for identifying the genuine parties to
cross-border tax disputes. The typical international tax dispute is
tripartite in that it involves the interests of both contracting states and the
taxpayer. After identifying the tripartite nature of such disputes and
noting that both international and national law safeguard individual
rights the apparent solution would seem to be that the individual taxpayer
should be party to the dispute.
However, this is not a well-founded solution since it is only
procedural and lacks normative insight. When one considers also the
normative aspect, the apparent solution is no more valid. The normative
discussion is guided by equitable norms accepted both in international
and national law. If one accepts that the primary goal of double tax
treaties is indeed to eliminate or at least reduce double taxation and if
states are trusted to accomplish this objective, then active taxpayer
participation in resolving the international tax dispute becomes
unnecessary. Thus, to conclude, if indeed dispute resolution aims at

149. This recommendation absorbs one feature from the proposal stipulated by
Franck with regard to investment treaties: the body's permanency. Franck supports the
"establishment of an independent, permanent appellate body with the authority to review
awards rendered under a variety of investment treaties." Franck supports the arbitration
process but suggests a permanent appellate body. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra
note 71, at 1525, 1617-25.
150. See the fairness argument discussed supra Part III.C.
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preventing double taxation (or non-taxation) the genuine parties are only
the signatory states.
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